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DOING THEOLOGY AT THE MEDIEVAL UNIVERSITY: 
THOMAS AQUINAS, JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, AND PE-
TER AURIOL IN DISCUSSION 
Dr. Florian Woller 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I dwell on a thirteenth and fourteenth-
century debate on what it meant to do theology in the Middle Ages. 
The paper stresses the plurality of approaches to theology, as they 
evolved in the setting of the medieval university. The first section pre-
sents this setting by considering the most important institutional and 
intellectual framework, viz., the medieval course of studies, the offices 
at the university, and the Aristotelian theory of science. As I argue in 
the second and third sections, the debate on what it meant to do the-
ology in the later Middle Ages was heavily indebted to both the uni-
versity setting and to Aristotle's ideas on science. By presenting the 
accounts of Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and Peter Auriol, I 
would like to suggest that even within its rather rigid boundaries late 
medieval theology came to a theory of theology that was potentially 
pluralistic. This debate and its preliminary outcome, therefore, might 
serve as a reflection of a cross-cultural exchange. 
In the history of Christianity, we associate only few periods with 
a specific region or continent. This, however, is the case with the 
Middle Ages, for at least in its technical or historiographic sense 
we apply this term to the years, say, between 500 and 1550 AD, 
as they went down on the European continent. Whereas for the 
same years in other areas we may use terms like Post-Classical or 
Pre-Columbian Era, the Middle Ages always seem to connote Eu-
rope. It may therefore seem odd to include a paper on theology in 
the Latin Middle Ages in this essay collection that originates in 
an academic exchange between the Universities of Ghana, Legon 
and Basel. For the sake of argument, one could indeed think that 
my text should better be published in a European rather than in an 
African journal. 
Yet, a reflection on what it meant to learn and teach theology at 
the medieval university may also function as a bridge connecting 
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Basel with Legon, Africa with Europe.37 As I hope will be clear 
from the following remarks, theologians at the medieval univer-
sity dwelt on problems similar to those in contemporary theology. 
Although they thought about them in quite a different way and 
came to quite different solutions compared to our contemporaries, 
these intellectuals were equally concerned about the relation be-
tween theology and science on the one hand as well as theology . 
and faith on the other. Today we contextualize these problems and 
our theologies in a completely different way, but the fundamental 
trouble is the same: How can theology, science, and faith- what-
ever these terms may mean co-exist in such a way that none is 
simply reduced to another and that each has a well-contoured pro-
file? It is this question that connects both Basel and Legon theol-
ogies with the Middle Ages, and perhaps with one another as well. 
One reason for which I think that medieval thought may have this 
function is its equidistance to our respective cultural, theological, 
and intellectual backgrounds. What we look at when we study 
medieval theology is a sufficiently circumscribed complex, which 
as such allows us to identify the origins, the developments, and 
the consequences of virtually all topics that the medieval debated. 
Contemporary theologies from both continents of course make 
different claims of heritage with regard to medieval thought, but 
if we take the Middle Ages in their own right, they are indeed 
equidistant from our way of thinking. Accordingly, I do not want 
to argue for a privileged access to medieval thought by any con-
temporary strand of theology. The scope of my article is therefore 
limited to the introduction of a 'third player'. In itself, this player 
is not impartial or neutral at all. At the same time however, it is 
equally alien to our respective backgrounds. 
37 I would like to express my sincere gratitude for the overwhelming hospitality and 
'esprit de corps' that I had the privilege to experience during our stay at the Department 
for the Study of Religions, University of Ghana (Legon) in January 2015. The lively 
exchange and discussions with students and colleagues were stimulating for my work, 
just as they were but the beginning of which will hopefully be an opportunity for col-
laboration in the future. 
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~e~~e, the intellectual brid~e between Legan and Basel that I am 
mvitm~ ~e re~er to walk 1s made of ideas from a past that has 
no preJu~ice. to 1t~ future, that is to say, our present. I will con-
st~ct this bndge m three steps. First, I shall provide some insti-
tut10.nal and intellectual background, namely on the medieval uni-
versity ~d.the Aristotelian framework of theology. In the second 
part I will introduce Thomas Aquinas' (c. 1225-1274) and John 
Duns s.cotus' (c. 1266-1308) view of the relation between theol-
ogy~ s~ience, and faith, while in my third part I will present Peter 
Aunol s. (c. 1280-1322) model of "declarative theology" that, 
seen ag~mst ~he_ backgrou~d of his predecessors, marks a strong 
alternative withm the medieval debate. The article therefore · is 
meant to provide an introduction not only to the debate on th;ol-
ogy at the medieval university but also to its diversity in the 13th 
and 14th centuries. · 
I. Acquiring Intellectual Habits: The Medieval University and 
its Aristotelian Framework 
C~ntrarily to my remarks about the discontinuity between the 
Middle Ages and ~od~mity, the title of this paper seemingly sug-
gests a strong contmmty between medieval and our times. Even 
more than this, as academics we are heirs to a medieval invention 
tha! since its beginnings bore the name "universitas". However, 
while we common~y use this term as referring to the universality 
of~owledge that 1s taught at a university, the medieval gave it a 
social, legal, and political meaning. The first "universitates" were 
founded in Bologna in nowadays Italy, notably not by the masters 
but by the students of jurisprudence. It was the students who 
formed "unive~sitates" as corporate bodies by way of which they 
could fight their masters for certain 'cultural' liberties at school. 
Thus,· in Bologna the term "universitas" denoted an exclusive 
community. of st4dents. At the university of Paris, which was 
'founded shortly after Bologna at the tum towards the 13th century, 
the same term referred to an inclusive community of students and 
masters. The "universitas magistrorum et scolarium Paris-
iensium", i.e. the community of masters and students in Paris 
. ' 
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served as a vehicle for obtaining legal privileges and political au-
tonomy from the Bishop of Paris. Further down the Middle Ages, 
it was the Parisian rather than the Bolognese model that gained 
influence all over the continent. 38 
Theology as an academic discipline was invented in this univer-
sity environment. 39 Students could enrol in an institutionalized 
curriculum and were awarded with academic degrees. As the idea 
of the medieval university suggests, there was a clear-cut distinc-
tion between students and masters. Yet, especially in what we 
may call systematic theology, the teaching was largely done by 
bachelors who had not yet acquired the formal requirement for 
becoming masters. 40 The medieval bachelors of theology were 
accomplished by academics. It was not at all uncommon that 
when they received their Bachelor's degree they had already 
spent circa 14 years at the university - the first seven years as 
students of philosophy at the Faculty of Arts and the following 
seven years at the Faculty of Theology. 41 After this long period 
of learning and teaching, only a few obtained the licence to teach 
and subsequently had the chance to become masters at an 
38 For an excellent introduction to the beginnings and the medieval evolvement of the 
un~versity, see Jacques Verger, "The Universities and Scholasticism," in The New Cam-
bridge Medieval History, vol. V: c. ll98-c. 1300, ed. David Abulafia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 256-276. 
39 This, of course, does not mean that before the rise of the universities there was no 
theology. Rather, it is fair to say that theology in the sense of an intellectual investiga-
tion into the contents of Christian faith is as old as Christianity itself. For a concise 
survey of the origin of the term "theologia/0eoMyiu" see Ferdinand Kattenbusch, "Die 
Entstehung einer christlichen Theologie. Zur Geschichte der Ausdriicke 0EoMJYiu, 
0EOMJYEiV, 0eoA.6yoi;," Zeitschriftfor Theologie und Kirche 11 (1930), 161-205. 
40 Thus, we have to carefully distinguish between university degrees and offices. A bac-
calarius sententiarius could in fact act as teacher even before he obtained his full degree 
(baccalariusformatus) and the licence to teach as a "regent master"; for more on this, 
see Palemon Glorieux, "L'enseignement au moyen-iige. Techniques et methodes en us-
age a la Faculte de Theologie de Paris, au xme siecle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale 
et litteraire du moyen age 43 (1968), 94-100. 
41 A full-blown medieval university consisted of four faculties. At the entrance level 
everyone had to study the liberal arts (grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, 
music, and astronomy) before being admitted to the "higher faculties" of jurisprudence, 
medicine, or theology. 
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advanced age. The invention of the university thus entailed the 
invention of the professional academic. Being a professional, 
therefore, is a very important dimension of 'doing theology' at 
the medieval university. 
The way the medievals reflected on 'doing theology' had a 
straightforward connection to this institutional background. First, 
as I have just mentioned, they conceived themselves as profes-
sional theologians. Thus, when they reflected on their occupation, 
they did not do this just incidentally but with the firm objective to 
provide a theoretical foundation of their own profession. 42 But 
more importantly, they derived the theoretical'framework of their 
self-understanding from their own education in the liberal arts. 
The liberal arts had a long-standing history that went all the way 
back to the Classical Age, but with the dawn of the universities 
they were ·mainly taught according to the newly translated works 
of Aristotle, who became such a pre-eminent authority that he:was 
simply called the philosopher ("philosophus"), without further 
qualification. 43 Doing theology at the medieval university, there-
fore, meant to teach and learn a kind of theology that was dealing 
with Aristotle; be it that the pagan philosopher was 'christian-
ized', or that he served as the point of departure for theologies 
with different orientations (e.g. towards N ea-Platonism or Augus-
tine). 
The passages of Aristotelian philosophy that are most relevant for 
our topic originate in the 'philosopher's' theory of science and in 
his philosophical psychology. Rather than being a system of 
42 The importance of this topic is emphasized by its position in one of the main literary 
genres of medieval theology, namely in the commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sen-
tenc-es, where it habitually appears at the very beginning. For more on this, see Florian 
Woller, Theologie und Wissenschaft bei Petrus Aureoli. Ein scholastischer Entwurf aus 
dem fruhen 14. Jahrhundert, Texte und Studien zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 
117 (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 6-13. 
43 The significance of the astonishing arrival of Aristotle at the medieval university is 
difficult to overestimate. For a concise overview of the effect that Aristotelianism had 
on medieval philosophy see Paul Vincent Spade, "Medieval Philosophy", Stanford En-
cyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ medieval-philoso-
phy/ (15 July 2015), and the references given there. 
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thought or set of ideas, science, according to Aristotle, is defmed 
by a certain method of demonstration or proof and constitutes a 
quality of the soul. Regarding the latter, Aristotle's basic assump-
tion is that any given substance can take on certain qualities. 
Take, for example, as a kettle stands on a burning stove and it 
becomes hot. Aristotle thought that, strictly speaking, it is not the 
kettle that becomes hot, but rather that the quality of 'being hot' 
attaches itself to the kettle. Therefore, the kettle itself (the kettle 
insofar it is nothing else than a kettle) does not undergo any 
change while being heated or cooled down again. All what hap-
pens is that the qualities of 'hot' and 'cold' attach to and detach 
from the kettle. Roughly the same holds true for science as a qual-
ity of the soul. Science or (to use a less improper translation of 
the Greek episteme) scientific knowledge attaches itself to the 
soul. However, if we compare the intellect's acquisition of sci-
ence with the kettle's warming, an important difference emerges, 
for according to Aristotle, the kettle may lose the quality of being 
hot, while the intellect retains its knowledge. The intellect might 
of course lose its knowledge as well, but this does not seem to 
happen just as easily and quickly as with the qualities of the kettle. 
Therefore, knowledge can be said to stick to the intellect and thus 
dispose of it in a less ephemeral manner.44 
This 'sticky' quality is a habit, Aristotle tells us.45 Just as a simple 
quality, a habit is ontologically different from the subject, in 
which it inheres; but unlike a simple quality a habit disposes the 
subject for certain acts. Take, for example, the virtue of justice, 
which, according to Aristotle, is a habit just like knowledge. The 
soul acquires the habit of justice by executing just acts and is thus 
disposed to further acts of justice. Hence, from a just judge, who 
has passed just sentences, we may not only expect that she has the 
virtue of justice, but also that she will pass further just sentences. . 
Generally speaking, therefore, the intellect acquires a habit P 
44 See Aristotle, Categoriae 8 8b26-35. 
4s See Aristotle, Metaphysica V 20 1022b 10-11. 
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through acts of P and is thus disposed for further acts of the same 
kind P. In the case of knowledge, this then means that a human 
being does not know anything right from the start, but only by 
virtue of the acquired habit of science he or she may be called a 
scientist; and as such we may expect further science from her or 
him. To the medievals, this basic theory of science as a habit of 
the intellect seemed to perfectly capture what was going at the 
university. Medieval academics kept acquiring knowledge for a 
long time, before they started to teach ever more; which is to say 
that they performed acts of knowledge that flew forth from the 
habit which they had acquired through other.acts of the same kind. 
In another way, however, medieval thinkers struggled with this 
concept of science, for not all disciplines at the medieval univer-
sity complied with what Aristotle had taught about the proper acts 
of the scientific habit. He had defined the act of knowledge as the 
insight into the truth of a proposition by way of demonstration, so 
that scientific knowledge relies on the proof that a proposition is 
necessarily true. Now, the paramount device for providing this 
crucial condition of knowledge was the syllogism. Take, for ex-
ample, the proposition 'All Greeks are mortal'. To know this 
proposition, according to Aristotle, means to hold it true on the 
grounds of the two premises 'All Greeks are human beings' and 
'All human beings are mortal'. From these premises the necessary 
truth of the conclusion 'All Greeks are mortal' can be inferred, 
precisely because the premises themselves have already been 
proven to be true. Scientific knowledge, therefore, rests on previ-
ous knowledge to which the same condition of necessary truth 
applies.46 
To sum up, the Aristotelian concept of science was founded on 
two assumptions. Firstly, on a psychological level the 'philoso-
p!J.er' taught that science was a habit. 
46 For a more thorough presentation of Aristotle's account of science, see Robin Smith, 
"Aristotle's Logic, 6. Demonstrations and Demonstrative Sciences," The Stanford En-
cyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ aristotle-logic/ (20 
August 2015). 
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To this theory the medieval academics were generally sympa-
thetic, as they thought that it nicely reflected their own experi-
ence, not least at the university. Secondly, Aristotle defined an act 
of knowledge as the insight into the necessary truth of a proposi-
tion by way of demonstration. Medieval thinkers embraced this 
idea wholeheartedly, although they struggled with applying it to 
some of their academic disciplines. More precisely, it was the re-
quirement of any proper knowledge to be inferred from previous 
knowledge that was required to be equally proven to be true. This 
problem stirred the medieval debate on the concept of science. 
With regard to the reflection on what it meant to do theology at 
the medieval university, this assumption was perhaps the heaviest 
but also the most productive burden. 
II. Theology between Knowledge and Faith: The Accounts of 
Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274) and John Duns Scotus (c. 
1266-1308) 
From what I have said thus far, the fundamental problems of the 
debate on the scientific character of theology quickly become ap-
parent. The medieval academics reflected on their own occupa-
tion or profession (as I may stress) at the university in the Aristo-
telian term of habits. During their studies they assumed to acquire 
one or many of such habits that comply in different degrees with 
the notion of scientific knowledge. The medievals believed that a 
mathematician, for example, had the scientific habit of mathemat-
ics, just as a grammarian was assumed to have the scientific habit 
of grammar. 
One highly problematic case, however, was theology. Given that 
to have a scientific habit meant to have insight into the necessary 
truth of a proposition by way of demonstration, virtually every 
medieval theologian felt that there was a fundamental pisagree-
ment between theology and science. Nobody in the Middle Ages 
would have maintained, for example, that a proposition such as 
'God is one and triune' could be proven to be necessarily true on 
the grounds of previous knowledge. Many argued that theology 
rests on revelation, as it might be found in Scripture or in the 
teachings of the Church, rather than on any sort of knowledge that 
44 I Ghana Bulletin of Theology New Series, Volume 5 (July, 2016) 
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is proven to be necessarily true. The debates on these questions 
were controversial. At times, medieval theologians accused their 
colleagues who belonged to the school of thought that theology 
was more than more a particularly informed variation of faith to 
be, the ruin of the Church. Whereas those who argued for a 
properly scientific habit of theology were blamed for academic 
elitism.47 This is not the place to recapitulate the whole history of 
the problem. 48 Yet, by briefly presenting the most prominent ar-
guments for and against a properly scientific character of theol-
ogy in the Middle Ages, I hope to trace out the field of the debate. 
The classical account of theology as a science goes back to 
. Thomas Aquinas. The 'Angelic Doctor' argued that theology in-
deed complies with the notion of science, because, according to 
Thomas, it relies on 'previous knowledge', from which the nec-
essary truth of a theological proposition can be inferred. From 
this, however, it does not follow that theologians can actually per-
form the acts of gaining insight into the 'previous' truths, because 
in this life the ordinary theologian remains in a state of partial 
ignorance. To him, many propositions in theology remain obscure 
and unintelligible. Therefore, theology is not a complete science, 
as it were, but rather a "subaltern" science; which is to say that 
within theology the human intellect does not gain insight into the 
necessary truth of all the 'previous knowledge' on which theology 
is founded.49 
47 One such polemical controversy dragged on for about 20 years at the end of the thir-
teenth century. For more on this, see Woller, Theologie, 80-93, and Katherine Konig-
Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique culture/le, 
Etudes de philosophie medievale 98 (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 81-90 and 111-123. . 
48 For the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, an attempt has recently been made by 
Francesco Fiorentino, Conoscenza ·scientijica e teologi" frq Xlll e XIV secolo, 
Biblioteca filosofica di Quaestio 19 (Bari: Edizioni di Pfl~tna, 2014). 
49 'thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, quaestio l, articulus 2, co., ed. Leon!na 4 
(Rome: Vatican Polyglot Press, 1888), 9a: "Respondeo dicendum sacram doctr1n~m 
esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quaedam emm 
sunt, quae procedunt ex principiis noti.s lumine naturali intellectu.s, ~i':?t ari~hmeti~, 
geometria, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero sunt, quae procedunt ex pnnc1pus not1s lu~ne 
superioris scientiae, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geome!"am, 
et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis". Aquinas' Opera omnia, accordmg to 
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It is in this second way that sacred doctrine is a science. For it proceeds 
from first principles known by the higher science, viz., the science had 
by God and the blessed in heaven. So just as music takes on faith the 
principles handed down to it by arithmetic, so too sacred doctrine 
takes on faith the principles revealed to it by God. 50 
There is nothing mysterious about the subaltern character of the-
ology, Thomas argues. For we may find other disciplines that are 
equally subaltern to a 'higher' science. Take the example of mu-
sic, which, according to medieval standards, is about numerical 
proportions. Now, in order for us to have insight into the truth of 
a numerical proportion, we must first gain some previous 
knowledge, e.g. about numbers. This, however, does not pertain 
to the science of music itself, but rather to arithmetic. Thus, within 
the science of music we take this previous knowledge for granted, 
which is tantamount to saying that we take over the principles of 
music from arithmetic. Therefore, music is subaltern to arithme-
tic. 
Now, the same applies to theology, Thomas tells us. Theology, as 
we are able to do it, rests on 'previous knowledge' that is proven 
to be necessarily true, not within theology but by higher sciences, 
namely by the sciences of those who are able to gain insight into 
the necessary truth of propositions such as 'God is one and tri-
une'. These are the sciences of God and (with some qualifica-
tions) the blessed souls that are assumed to directly dwell on 
God's essence. 51 Once the human mind does theology, it accepts 
the principles of theology from these higher sciences, as they are 
the currently best editions, are availabe through the Corpus Thomisticum, ed. Enrique 
Alarcon,http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ iopera.html (15 July 2015). 
so Thomas Aqwnas, Summa Theologiae I, quaestio l, articulus 2, co., translated by Al-
fred J. Freddoso, http://www3.nd.edu/-afreddos/summa-translation/Part% 201/ stl-
quesOl.pdf, p. 3 (15 July 2015); ed. Leonina 4 (as note 13), 9a-b: "E! ho~ m~do sacra 
doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superions sc1ent1ae, quae 
scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab 
arithmetico ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo." 
"In schola~tic theology, the science of the blessed souls (scientia beatorum) ~nctJons 
as a threshold for theological evidence. What the blessed cognize by way ofthe1r direct 
access to the divine truths must not be attained by the human mind, which, despite of 
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handed down in Scripture or the creed. Therefore, theology is sub-
altern to the sciences of God and the blessed. For his vision of 
theology as a subaltern science, Thomas referred to Aristotle, who 
indeed had introduced the idea of subalternating (i.e. the 'higher') 
and subaltern (i.e. the 'lower') sciences.52 However, many medi-
eval thinkers felt that Aquinas' application of this idea to theology 
was rather mysterious; their main reason being that Thomas 
talked about "faith" by way of which theology accepts its 'previ-
ous knowledge'. 53 , 
The difficulty was that faith was largely thought to be incompat-
ible with science. For, again according to Aristotle, faith (pistis or 
"fides") is a different habit and thus a different way of holding a 
proposition to be true. For example, if I have faith in the truth of 
the proposition 'All Greeks are mortal', I firmly believe the prop-
osition to be true, without having proven its truth, which is to say 
that I do nothave insight into its necessary truth on the grounds 
of previous knowledge. On account of this definition of faith it is 
clear why the medievals held faith and science as incompatible; 
for if the truth of a given proposition is founded on demonstration, 
the intellect knows this truth (or holds it in the habit of science), 
whereas if a truth is not founded on demonstration, the intellect 
believes this truth ( or holds it in the habit of faith). 54 Many of 
Aquinas' readers were troubled by this 
its amazing capabilities, may in no way trespass this boundary. For more on this, see 
Woller, Theologie, 83-85. 
52 An excellent study of the subalternation of sciences in Aristotle, Aquinas, and others 
may be found in Stephen J. Livesey, Theology and Science in the 14th Century: Three 
Questions on the Unity and Subaltematio11 of the Sciences from John of Reading's 
Commenta,y on the Sentences. Introduction and Critical Edition, Studien und Texte 
zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 25 (Brill: Leiden, 1989), 20-53. 
53 In :mother text, Aquinas is even more explicit by arguing that the human mind re-
ceives the principles of theology through "infused faith"(" ... in quantum per fidem 
nobis infusam inheremus ipsi prime veritati propter se ipsam," Thomas Aquinas, Super 
Boetium de trinitaie, quaestio 2, articulus 2, co., ed. Leonina SO (Rome: Vatican Poly-
glot Press, 1992), 95b; see. this text online in the Corpus Thomislicum [ as note 13]). 
.54 Aristotle deals with pis tis and e.pisteme in De anima Ill 3 428a 18-24 and Topica I 1 
100bl9-21 
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problem, and among them was the Franciscan philosopher and 
theologian John Duns Scotus.55 
Scotus argued for a clear distinction between science, faith, and 
theology. Against Aquinas, he pointed out that because 
knowledge rests upon previous knowledge, the intellect cannot 
know a conclusion by way of inferring it from a premise that it 
only believes to be true, which seemed to have been Aquinas' as-
sumption. According to Scotus, from a premise held in the habit 
of faith, only such a conclusion can be reached that is equally held 
in the habit of faith and not in the habit of science. However, this 
is not what happens in theology, Scotus thinks. A theologian be-
gins a syllogism from a premise that she holds in the habit of faith, 
as for example from what she finds in Scripture. Then, by "mixing 
in philosophy (which without any doubt is of great value, espe-
cially if it is metaphysics)", she adduces further arguments to the 
passage from Scripture and from there reaches her conclusion, 
which she does not hold in a habit of science but in a habit "dif-
ferent from faith". 56 Doing theology, therefore, neither means to 
know nor to believe in any strict sense; rather, it is something 
"different from faith". 57 
ss It is important to stre·,:s that Scotus was neither the first nor the only theologian to 
· criticise Aquinas' idea n.fthe subaltemation of theology. For an excellent swvey, see 
Camille Dumont, La thblogie comme science chez /es Scolastiques du trezieme siecle. 
Histoire de la question ''11trum theo/ogia sit scientia" de 1230 a 1320 (Louvain, 1962). 
S6 John Duns Scotus, Lectura Ill, distinctio 24, quaestio unica, ed. Vaticana 21 (Vatican 
Press: Vatican City, 2004), 148, nr. 61: "Si autem exponit per alias scientias, ad quod 
ultimo devenerunt doctores immiscendo philosophiam sacrae Scripturae (quod sine 
dubio multum valet, et praecipue metaphysicalia), ut veritas Scripturae ... intelligatur, 
tune dico quad conclusio non habet maiorem certitudinem quam altera praemissarum 
quae minus certa est . . . ldeo nee conclusio erit demonstrativa, generans scientiam, 
quamvis possit generare habitum alium a fide." For the context of this passage, see 
WOiler, Theo/ogie, 269-272. 
s1 For an excellent introduction to theology according to Scotus, cf. Stephen F. Brown, 
"Scotus' Method in Theology," in Methodologica ad mentem Joann is Duns Scoti (PAA 
Edizioni Antonianum: Rome, 1995), l: 229-243. 
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III. Potentially Pluralistic: Peter Auriol's (c. 1280-1322) Ac-
count of Declarative Theology 
There are two main upshots in Scotus' idea of what it meant to do 
theo~ogy at the medieval university. Firstly, when he said that the-
ologians make use of philosophy and, especially, metaphysics, 
Scotus argued for a specific integration of philosophy and theol-
ogy to_the extent that theology benefits from philosophy. At the 
same time, however, he also emphasized the distinction between 
these two disciplines, when he claimed that theology was distinct 
from science (which, I take it, includes philosophy)and to a lesser 
deg~ee from ~ai~h. This leads to Scotus' se.cond point: theology 
has its own digmty, which, in medieval terms, is to say that it is a 
proper habit. According to Scotus, the theological habit is com-
patible with faith, so that the intellect can believe the truth of a 
proposition and hold it in the habit of theology. ss 
Peter Auriol, another Franciscan theologian, remarked that all this 
is ~icely said. Hm;vever,to state that in theology the intellect ac-
quires a habit "that is not science and yet is different from faith is 
insufficient ... because it is not made clear what that habit is." 59 
For if in the habit of science, the intellect gains insight into the 
truth of a proposition by way of demonstration, whereas in the 
?a~it of fait? the intellect assents to such truth without any proof, 
1t 1s hard to see any alternative or middle ground where the habit 
of theology fits in. According to Auriol, Scotus' definition lacked 
precision, above all as what regarded the acts of the proper habit 
of theology. Auriol' s own definition of the theological habit was 
this: 
58 
§ee John Duns Scotus, Lectura III, distinctio 24, quaestio unica, (as note 20), p. 149, 
nr. 64. 
59 
Peter Auriol, Scriptum in primum Sententiarum, prologue, sect. 1, ed. Buytaert, 
Eligius M. (The Franciscan Institute: St. Bonaventure, NY, 1952), p. 153, nr. 74. For 
more on Peter Auriol, see the Peter Auria/ Homepage (administrated by Russell L. 
Friedman and Florian Woller), http//www.peterauriol.net (20 August 2015) as well as 
Friedman, Russell L., "Peter Auriol", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/auriol/ (20 August 2015). 
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[The habit of theology] is only declarative, for every habit that makes 
something to be better imagined by the intellect without producing any 
assent is declarative. 60 
Here Auriol tells us what the intellect, having acquired the habit 
of theology, does and what it does not do. It "imagines something 
better" and does not "assent" to it. Hence, in contrast to the acts 
of the habits of science and faith, in theology the intellect does 
not affirm the truth of a proposition (be it with or without a 
demonstration), but instead it has a better understanding or "im-
agination'' of this truth. Now, this does not mean that theology 
does not care for truth. Rather, according to Auriol, before the 
intellect 'does' theology it already has the habit of faith and thus 
believes the contents of faith to be true. Then theology takes over, , 
by way Jr which the intellect only comes to a better understanding i 
of these truths that it formerly believed to be true and therefore 
assented to them. Thus, through theology the assent to truths of 
faith neither increases nor decreases, but rather stays the same as 
in the habit of faith. The 'understanding without assent' is what 
Auriol calls the act of the declarative habit of theology. 61 
On the face of it, Auriol seems to only emend and extend Scotus' 
account of theology. Like Scotus, Auriol, by arguing for the com-
patibility of faith and theology, drew theology closer to faith and 
farther from science. Furthermore, by claiming that theology pre-
supposes faith and adds further 'declarations', Auriol made his 
account of declarative theology sound very similar to what Scotus 
had said about the role of philosophy within theology. But while 
it may be correct to acknowledge this similarity, Auriol went 
much further. He fundamentally transformed the way in which 
medieval theologians thought about their profession. I shall make 
this the conclusion of my paper. 
60 Peter Auriol, Scrip tum, prologue, sect. 1 (as note 23), p. 112: " ... huiusmodi habitus 
est tantummodo declarativus. Omnis enim habitus, qui facti aliquid imaginari melius 
per intellectum absque omni adhaesione 
61 For a mi1ch more detailed analysis of Auriol's declarative theology, cf. Wt\ller, The-
ologie, 277-288. 
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As I have said above, Peter Auriol's declarative habit of theology 
bears th~ ~haracte1istic that it does not generate any form of as-
sent. This 1s hard to understand, of course, for Auriol seems to tell 
us !h~t we can thi~k about a proposition without assenting to it, 
be 1t m a~ affirm~t1ve_ or negative manner. But this is not exactly 
what Aunol has m mmd, for according to him, the assent comes 
'before' theology, viz., through the habit of faith. Thus, Auriol 
can say that if you ask theologians "why they believe [in an article 
of faith], they will not answer that they believe because of theo-
logical arguments but because of faith." 62 Therefore, theology 
does not influence faith in any direct manner. By explaining the 
~ontent of faith (not by demonstrating), theology only makes the 
mtellect better understand and "imagine", so that from tQ.eology 
alone, no human intellect will ever be brought to assent or faith. 
If we now look back on Aquinas' and Scotus' positions, the trans-
formation of theology in Auriol becomes clearer. According to 
Aq~in~s, the human mind gains knowledge through theology, 
which 1s to say that it assents to theological conclusions and holds 
them to be necessarily true on account of the respective demon-
strations. According this account of theology, the intellect cannot 
but assent, as it is coerced to affirm a proposition on the grounds 
of its necessary truth. Scotus, on the other hand, seemed to hold 
that by doing theology the intellect comes to a more elaborate 
habit of faith, as it were. He argued for a model of theology that 
was yet different from faith but considered conclusions from such 
premises that we;e held in the habit of faith. Accordingly, doing 
theology according to Scotus means to corroborate and intensify 
faith. I 
Peter Auriol's model of a declarative habit dissociates theology 
from botµ faith and science. His claim that in contrast to faith and 
62 Peter Auriol, Scriptum in primum Sententiarum, distinctio 48, articulus 3, eds. 
Sch~bel, Chris/Woller, Florian (http://www.peterauriol.net/auriol-pdf/SCR-48.pdf, 
version 1 of October 1, 2014), 16, 11. 793-4: "si tales amotis dubiis interrogentur cur 
credunt, semper respondebunt quod non propter huiusmodi rationes sed propter ipsam 
fidem." 
51 I Ghana Bulletin of Theology New Series, Volume S (July, 2016) 
Dr. Florian Woller 
science, theology does not entail assent may seem as a degrada-
tion of theology, because doing this kind of theology does not lead 
to the intellect holding the truth of a proposition with any greater 
certitude than without theology. But what I think is more im-
portant to note is that declarative theology opens up for more than 
just one truth; be it, as in Aquinas, a necessary truth or, as in Sco-
tus, a firmly fixed truth of faith. Declarative theology is indeed 
potentially pluralistic, as it opens up for different explanations 
and declarations of the contents of faith. Even if these explana-
tions tum out to be dissonant and perhaps incompatible, in declar-
ative theology there is room for debate without the risk of dimin-
ishing or increasing the certitude of religious belief. 
This brings us back to where we started, for my main objective 
with this paper was to show the multifaceted way in which late 
medieval theologians thought about their own profession. Yet, I 
also hope to have made a point for Peter Auriol's potentially plu-
ralistic model of theology. Now, I do not want to suggest declar-
ative theology as a viable account for contemporary debate but 
rather leave it· in the Middle Ages and thus consider it in its own 
right. However, I also think that taking into account the medieval 
debates may prove to be useful for an ongoing exchange between 
Legon and Basel, Ghana and Switzerland. 
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JESUS CHRIST AS A STUMBLING BLOE~IN--IN+ERRE-
LIGIOUS DIALOGUE? 
Prof. Reinhold Bernhardt 
ABSTRACT: I start my reflections with a view at the situation of re-
ligious plurality in Switzerland and in the city of Basel and give a brief 
sketch of the development towards a "theology of religions" during 
the last decades. Then I focus on the question of how to understand 
the salvific relevance of Jesus Christ in relation to other religions. Is 
Jesus Christ a, or rather the stumbling block in interreligious dia-
logue? I suggest to understand the doctrine of the human and the di-
vine nature of Jesus Christ in terms of two relations - the relation to 
humanity and the relation to God - and relating those two relations 
by the concept of representation. That allows to conceive of Jesus 
Christ as representing God's creative and salvific presence in a most 
authentic but not exclusive way. That understanding leads to the ex-
pectation that also in non-Christian traditions occurrences of God's 
grace are to be found. 
I. Religious Plurality 
In Europe religious pluralism has increased in the last decades, 
mostly due to labour migration but also due to refugees coming 
from Syria, Iraq and African countries. On the other hand, the 
mainline churches are in decline. They are losing members, 
mainly in the big cities. Let me give you a very brief overview of 
the religious landscape in Switzerland as a whole and in the city 
of Basel. 
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